Labour is no longer for the traditional working class.

Labour is no longer for the traditional working class.

Labour Party: A Bet on Downward Mobility

Labour Party

The Divorce between the Labour Party and the Working Class

On July 3rd, Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the Labour Party, proclaimed that his party is “the political voice of the working class.” However, this claim is far from true. The Labour Party has been steadily losing its connection to the working class for the past three decades, and under Corbyn’s leadership, this disconnect continues to grow.

This divide between the party and the workers can be traced back to two distinct phases. The first phase occurred under Tony Blair, who envisioned the Labour Party as the voice of the professional middle class – the educated individuals who embraced free markets and progressive values. The party’s apparatus was taken over by homogenous professional politicians, mainly women, who were university-educated and worked for think tanks. Consequently, the working class, which the party was originally created to represent, felt increasingly detached.

While this strategic shift allowed the Labour Party to win three consecutive elections, warning signs were already present. The traditional working class started to disengage from politics, party membership plateaued, and voter turnout declined. From the 1970s to the early 2000s, voter turnout dropped from nearly 80% to an average of 63%. New Labour became a party that the working class knew little about and cared even less for.

The second phase occurred with the rise of Jeremy Corbyn. While the leader may perceive himself as a champion of the working class, his understanding of this segment is more of a figment of his imagination than a reflection of reality. Corbyn himself grew up in a manor house and represents a constituency untouched by industrialization or deindustrialization. More significantly, his leadership has resulted in the party being increasingly dominated by ethnic minorities, public-sector professionals, and disillusioned millennials who are unable to step onto the property ladder.

Drawing from membership figures, it is evident that 77% of Labour Party members belong to the middle class. The percentage of Labour MPs with manual work experience has declined from 16% in 1979 to a mere 3% today, while the party’s most powerful pressure group, Momentum, consists of educated millennials. While Labour was once the party of the working class, it has now become a middle-class party, detached from the concerns and experiences of working-class Britons.

The Takeover and the Hard Times of the Traditional Working Class

This takeover of the Labour Party by other groups coincides with the challenging circumstances faced by the traditional British working class, specifically the white-working class. The proportion of working-age men without qualifications who are not actively participating in the labor force has risen from 4% in the mid-1990s to a staggering 30% today. Additionally, poor white British children consistently perform worse in school compared to other ethnic groups. The suicide rate among men has also surged, with 75% of reported suicides in the United Kingdom in 2016 being male. Low-skilled men, particularly those in the construction industry, face a suicide risk three times higher than the male average.

Nevertheless, many activists associated with the Labour Party continue to demonize white men, regardless of their humble backgrounds, as oppressors. The term “white male” is used as an accusation rather than a description in significant segments of the party. This dynamic leaves many working-class individuals in the north voting for Labour out of a sense of traditional loyalty, despite the party no longer being truly representative of their interests.

A Future Strategy for the Labour Party

While the disconnect between the Labour Party and the working class persists, the party’s direction may be somewhat logical. The ethnic-minority population in Britain is rapidly expanding and becoming more politically engaged. In the 2017 general election, 73% of ethnic-minority voters supported Labour, compared to only 39% of ethnically white voters. Additionally, Labour’s stronghold lies in heavily Muslim areas, such as the Midlands, rather than traditional industrial regions. The public-sector middle class remains substantial and discontented millennials have the potential to be game-changers in British politics.

In light of slow economic growth, over-expanded universities that often foster anti-Western sentiment, and the rise of smart machines replacing professional services, Corbyn’s strategy of betting on downward mobility may be justified. The Labour Party seems to be cultivating an “alienated intelligentsia,” reliant on the votes of educated millennials to win future elections.

While Tony Blair’s decision to focus on upward mobility suited the era of neo-liberalism, Corbyn’s decision to veer towards downward mobility may align more closely with the effects of the financial crisis and the rise of populism rooted in economic disadvantage.

Ultimately, the Labour Party’s transformation into a party of the middle class, divided fairly equally between men and women, relying heavily on non-white voters, particularly Muslims, signals a departure from its working-class origins. The future of the party may heavily depend on Corbyn’s ability to navigate the changing dynamics of British society and attract diverse support.