Ukraine’s potential choice of war of attrition

Ukraine's potential choice of war of attrition

The Battle Between Ukraine and Russia: A Grueling War of Attrition

It has been two months since Ukraine launched its counter-offensive against Russian-held territory, spanning over 1,000 kilometers. The campaign has entered into a distinct second phase, following a rocky start. Newly formed mechanized units initially struggled to make progress but were soon supplemented by Ukraine’s advantage in long-range firepower, targeting Russian supply lines, logistical hubs, and command centers. This strategy aims to hinder Russian forces’ ability to respond effectively to Ukraine’s probing operations. Moreover, Ukraine has embarked on a series of small-scale drone strikes on Moscow and naval drone attacks on Russian patrol vessels in the Black Sea, seeking to drive home the message that no one is immune from the conflict.

Despite the commitment of Ukraine’s new 10th Corps, which includes three brigades equipped with Western military gear, progress in the counter-offensive remains challenging and slow. Ukrainian forces continue to engage in attacks along multiple axes, liberating small increments of territory. The total area retaken since the start of the counter-offensive amounts to approximately 200 square kilometers. The arrival of the 10th Corps seems to have provided some relief to the 9th Corps, which bore the brunt of the fighting since early June, but it has not yet heralded a distinctive new phase of operations.

Britain’s chief of the defense staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, has described Ukraine’s operational strategy as “starve, stretch, and strike.” The starve phase involves targeting logistics hubs, while the stretch phase includes probes and feints across multiple axes. The upcoming strike phase will require the deployment of fresh brigades to punch through the main Russian defensive line. However, it is unclear which axis General Zaluzhny, commander of Ukrainian armed forces, will choose for the main thrust, as operational security remains tight.

Driving south from Zaporizhzia to Melitopol and the Sea of Azov would offer the greatest strategic reward for Ukraine, splitting Russian forces, severing their land bridge to Crimea, and putting much of the peninsula within reach of Ukrainian artillery and missiles. Yet, this route involves breaching heavily fortified Russian lines and pushing through the most densely defended area of the entire front.

The Ukrainians have discovered that large armored formations, exposed to Russian drones, become highly vulnerable to air attacks when hindered by minefields and other obstacles. Currently, the limited successes achieved by Ukrainian forces stem from actions carried out at the platoon and company levels, using tree lines and small settlements for cover.

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An alternative strategy could involve capitalizing on weaker Russian defenses in the east around the destroyed town of Bakhmut and then heading south into the Donbas region. Although politically damaging for the Russians, this option would offer less strategic advantage for the Ukrainians than reaching the coast. Nevertheless, focusing on Bakhmut now may divert some Russian forces away from the south, potentially opening up other gaps.

The success of the Ukrainian offensive will heavily depend on whether the Russians can withdraw from exposed positions in an orderly manner or if their troops, already worn down by months of combat, crack under pressure. The effectiveness of Ukrainian attrition since mid-June will be measured by the Russians’ response and the resilience of their command structure, which has been strained by internal fractures.

However, expecting the Ukrainians to execute swift, audacious moves akin to “dash and drama” warfare would be unfair. Unlike Western armed forces, the Ukrainians lack overwhelming firepower and air supremacy. They have not had decades to master combined-arms warfare, and Russia has utilized a vast number of drones, similar to the impact of machine guns in World War I, to bolster its defenses.

With autumn mud fast approaching, the Ukrainians must achieve some degree of success before offensive options become further hampered. Success is crucial for both the morale of their soldiers and civilians and to maintain the confidence of their allies. It also serves to convince the man in the Kremlin that his options are only going to worsen.

In evaluating Ukrainian success, it is important to recognize their unique style of warfare, rather than encouraging them to imitate Western best practices. Analysts argue that Ukraine should be helped to “fight the way it fights best,” acknowledging the logic of attrition.

By embracing the strategy of relentless attrition, Ukraine aims to gradually wear down Russian defenses and gain a strategic advantage. The war of attrition may not provide the immediate gratification of swift victories, but it offers Ukraine a path to success and a chance to prevail against their formidable adversary.